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The law of contracts for the benefit of third persons has gone
through the same development in the federal courts as in the
state courts; and the result is now substantially the 'same,
especially because the federal courts are usually applying what
purports to be the law of some particular state.
While the law of third party beneficiaries is a part of the
general common law of the land, that "common law" must be
regarded as a continually developing law. It is not the law of
the Anglo-Saxons, nor the Norman law of Edward I, nor even
the law of the American colonies in 1776. It is certainly not
the English law of Tweddle v. Atkimon. or Dundop Tyre Co. v.
Selfidge.2 It now contains large elements derived from equity
sources, the law merchant, and the Roman law. Above all, it
has undergone a continual process of change and development
by legislative and judicial action. In this process of change
and development, the law of no subject can long remain "com-
mon" to fifty jurisdictions, in the sense that the courts of those
jurisdictions will continue to decide with uniformity and to
lay down uniform general rules of. decision. There are some
differences among the states as to the law of third party bene-
ficiaries. This law is. within the control of the state courts and
legislatures, and it will be recognized and applied by the federal
courts.
The question whether a third party has a right against the
promisor is a question of substantive law and not one of proce-
dure only. Therefore, the federal courts will apply the law of
-1 Best & S. 393 (1861).
2 [1915] A. C. 847. As to the law of England, see the article by the
present writer in (1930) 46 L. Q. REv. 12.
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the state whose law is regarded as determining the legal opera-
tion of the contract. It cannot be said that there is "a federal
law" or a law of the federal courts. Cases in the federal courts
will be determined in accordance with that system that the
court deciding the case thinks is applicable to the contract
involved in that case. This means that in the federal courts
there may be many laws as to third party beneficiaries, not
merely one law or system.
The question whether a third party has a right against the
promisor is a question of substantive law and not one of pro-
cedure. But the question of substantive "rights" cannot be
separated from the question of remedies; and remedies and
procedure are also overlapping fields. Pragmatically, the test
of existence of a legal right is the availability of some legal
remedy, direct or indirect. Unless the judicial and executive
officers of government take some notice of a supposed "right"
and will act in such a way as to constitute a societal sanction,
there is no reason for saying that the claimant has a jural right.
If this is "pragmatically" true, it is mere inconsequential ver-
biage to say that it is "theoretically" not true. Of course, any one
can by constructing his own language and his own definitiops
build up a consistent "theory" of rights; but the problem of the
lawyer and the judge is, What are we to do about it? In the
case of a third party beneficiary, therefore, the particular court
must determine whether or not under the system of law that it
administers it should act in such a way as to sanction the third
party's claim-should give some direct or indirect remedy. If
it does anything that will operate practically as a sanction, it is
recognizing and in some degree enforcing a right in the third
party. The form taken by this sanction-the form of the
"remedy" given-varies. It varies in effectiveness as well as
in "directness"; and it varies with the particular jurisdiction.
Therefore a court may feel limited in the remedies that it can
apply and in the procedure by which the issues are to be de-
termined, even though it can apply some remedy in accordance
with a particular procedure. Remedies and procedure are in-
deed determined by the law of the forum; but in determining
its remedies and procedure, the court is also determining its sub-
stantive law of rights and duties.
As to the substantive law, it is true that the federal courts,
like all other courts, must determine for themselves the rights
of the parties before them. In so far as they recognize and
enforce rights and duties, they adopt the law involved as the
law of the federal court and make it the federal law for the
sort of case before the court. But the law that they adopt does
not have to be drawn from federal statutes or antecedent federal
decisions; nor is it- krawn from some "brooding onnipres-
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ence in the sky" called a federal common law. It is drawn
from exactly the same sources that a state court draws its law,
including state statutes and decisions, customs and business
practices, the mores of the time and place. In the process, the
desire for uniformity has caused the federal court sitting within
a particular state to follow the rules that seem to have been
definitely established within that state. Therefore, while state-
ment, are not infrequent that the federal courts will determine
questions of general commercial law for themselves, it is neces-
sary to understand along with this that where commercial law
is not "general," the federal court will select its controlling law -
in accordance with the practice that prevails in cases where laws
conflict.3
What then have the federal courts in fact done with the cimhs
of third party beneficiaries? In fact they have recognized and
enforced them in the same cases in which the state courts en-
force them, with about the same amount of variation in ex-
planatory theory and inconsistency in decision. There is no
federal system as such, determining the rights of third parties-
Each federal district court sits within the limits of some state
and determines its own contract law, including that affecting-
third parties, and it selects the particular jurisdiction whose
system of law is to be applied in the case in hand just as a state
court would do. If by that law the third party has an enforce-
able right, the federal court recognizes and enforces it. The
remedies and the procedure of enforcement may not be identical
with those of the state court, although usually they are nearly so.
CASES IN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
In Hendrick v. LiEnay,4 H wrote to L requesting him to exe-
cute a certain appeal bond, and promised to give him " vhatever
security may be desired in the shape of a personal bond." L
procured M to execute the appeal bond with him. H executed
no bond of indemnity. Later, having had to pay on the appeal
bond, L and M sued H on his promise to L to give security. The
court held that M was a proper party plainti, since H's promise
3In Federal Sur. Co. v. Minneapolis S. & M. Co., 17 F. (2d) 242 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1927), the federal court sitting in Minnesota applied wvhat it.
erroneously supposed to be the law of Montana, the lex loci confract=,
deciding against the plaintiff.
In Duvall-Percival Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 16 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 8,.
1926), the federal court sitting in Kansas properly applied the law or
Missouri, deciding for the plaintiff, although on the exact issue the law-
of Kansas was contra.
In Federal Surety Co. v. City of Staunton, 29 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 5th,.
1928), the federal court sitting in Alabama applied the law of 3llinois.
93 U. S. 143 (1876).
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to L was for the benefit of whoever might sign the appeal bond.
The court said:
"It is also argued, as Mansfield's name does not appear in
the letters of Hendrick, that he could not join in this action.
This would be true, if the promise were under seal, requiring
an action of debt or covenant; but the right of a party to main-
tain assumpsit on a promise not under seal, made to another
for his benefit, although much controverted, is now the prevail-
ing rule in this country."
This case has never been overruled or disapproved, , although it
has occasionally been speciously explained as being a case in
which the co-plaintiff Mansfield was a promisee and "in privity."
Thd next case is NationaZ Bank v. G rand Lodge,0 in which a
bondholder sued the defendant because it had adopted' the fol-
lowing resolution:'
"Resolved, That this Grand Lodge assume the payment of the
$200,000 bonds, issued by the Masonic Hall Association, provided
that stock is issued to the Grand Lodge by said association to
the amount of said assumption of payment by this Grand Lodge
as the said bonds are paid."
It doesnot appear that this resolution was even an offer made
to the Association; if it was communicated as an offer, it does
not appear that it was ever accepted; it certainly does not ap-
pear that the Association ever delivered or tendered any stock
to the Grand Lodge. It is perfectly clear that if the Grand
Lodge ever made any promise whatever, it was conditional upon
the concurrent delivery of stock. The court rightly gave judg-
ment for the defendant on this ground; but it also based its
decision on the following statement of third party law:
5In Austin v. Seligman, 18 Fed. 519, 522 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1883), speak-
ing of the supposed English rule that no one bub the promisee can enforce
a contract, the court said: "It has the merit of simplicity, but is artificial
instead of being reasonable. According to good sense and upon principlo
there is no reason why a person may not maintain an action upon a con-
tract, although not a party to it, when the parties to the .contract intend
that he may do so. The formal or immediate parties to a contract are
not always the persons -who have the most substantial interest in its per-
formance. Sometimes a third person is exclusively interested in its ful-
filhnent. If the parties choose to treat him as the primary party in inter-
est, they recognize him as a privy in fact to the consideration and promise.
And the result of the better-considered decisions is that a third person
may enforce a contract made by others for his benefit, whenever it is
manifest from the nature or terms of the agreement that the parties in-
tended to treat him as the person primarily interested. The cases of
Hendrick v. Lindsay and Nat. Bank v. Grand Lodge, and the expressions
in the opinions, do not antagonize this proposition, but accord with it."
"98 U. S. 123, 124 (1878).
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"We do not propose to enter at large upon a consideration
of the inquiry how far privity of contract between a plaintiff
and defendant is necessary to the maintenance of an action of
assumpsit. The subject has been much debated, and the de-
cisions are not all reconcilable. No doubt the general rule is
that such a privity must exist. But there are confessedly many
exceptions to it. One of them, and by far the most frequent one,
is the case where, under a contract between two persons, as-
sets have come to the promisor's hands or under his control
which in equity belong to a third person.. In such a case it is
held that the third person may sue in his own name. But then
the suit is founded rather on the implied undertaking the law
raises from the possession of the assets, than on the empress
promise. Another exception is where the plaintiff is the bene-
ficiary solely interested in the promise, as where one person
contracts with another to pay money or deliver some valuable
thing to a third7 But where a debt already exists from one per-
son to another, a promise by a third person to pay such debt
being primarily for the benefit of the original debtor, and to
relieve him. from liability to pay it (there being no novation),
he has a right of action against the promisor for his own in-
demnity; and if the original creditor can also sue, the promisor
would be liable to two separate actions, and therefore the rule
is that the original creditor cannot sue."
In this statement the Court recognizes the right of a sole
beneficiary as one enforceable in assumpsit at law.8 Secondly,
assumpsit is said to be maintained if "assets" have come into
the promisor's hands that "in equity" belong to the plaintiff.
And thirdly, the plaintiff cannot maintain assumpsit on a
promise by the defendant to discharge the promisee's debt to
the plaintiff. In this third case the plaintiff is not a sole bene-
ficiary; but it may nevertheless be a case in which "assets" are
in the defendant's hands that "in equity" should go to the plain-
tiff. This statement of the Court was far from denying bene-
ficiaries a right "at law"; but the case has been cited a good
many times as so holding. The facts of the case were not such
as to require careful consideration of third party law; and the
decision has not in fact determined that law.
Keller v. A~skford D was a suit in equity by a mortgagee against
the mortgagor's grantee who had assumed the debt. Judgment
was given for the plaintiff, Gray, J., basing the decision on
7 This dictum as to the right of a sole beneficiary seems never to have
been denied; it is supported by the decisions on insurance policies issued
to one party for the benefit "of whom it may concern." Cf. Hagan v.
Scottish Union Ins. Co., 186 U. S. 423, 22 Sup. Ct. 862 (1902); Merchants
& A. T. Co. v. Robinson etc. Co.. 191 Fed. 769 (C. C. A, lst, 1911).
sA donee beneficiary; to -whom the promisee owed a moral duty only,
was given judgment in Maumee Val. Elec. Co. v. Toledo, 13 F. (2d) 98 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1926), and Gooch v. Buford, 262 Fed. 894 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920),
where a husband contracted for the benefit of his wife. •
9 13 3 U. S. 610, 10 Sup. Ct. 494 (1890).
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the ground that the mortgagor was in the position of a surety,
with the grantee as the principal debtor, and that the mortgagee
creditor would be subrogated to the surety's rights against the
principal. This theory had been used iis some of the early New
York cases, though not in England; and it has continued to
be used in some of the mortgage cases down to the present time.
Gray said that the defendant was under no "direct obligation"
to the mortgagee; but the practical result of the case was the
same as if he had called the relation of the defendant to the
plaintiff a "direct obligation." When the result is thus identical,
the fact that it was reached by a "subrogation" theory is of no
importance in the particular case. In order to show that it
is anything more than one possible intellectual expedient to
reach a desired result, actual decisions must be produced in which
the practical results have been affected by it.0
The subrogation theory may have had a decisive effect in
Wiltard v. Wood,- where the Court held that an action "at law"
could not be maintained in the District of Columbia by a mort-
gagee against the mortgagor's grantee who assumed the debt.
At any rate the creditor was denied a remedy "at law" be-
cause such was the law of "the forum." After a good deal of
fumbling, the plaintiff's attorney finally brought a bill in equity
against the grantee; and the Supreme Court dismissed the bill
because of laches. =
In Union Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford,3 the Court held that an
extension of time given by the mortgagee to a grantee who had
assumed the debt wholly discharged the mortgagor for the rea-
son that the assumption contract made the grantee the principal
debtor of the mortgagee and the mortgagor only a surety. Mr.
Justice Gray thought there would be difficulty in so holding if
the mortgagee's right was regarded as a merely equitable one,
as decided in Keller v. Ashford and Willrd v. Wood. He avoid-
ed that difficulty by saying that the plaintiff's right was de-
termined by the law of Illinois. The Court said:
"The question whether the remedy of.the mortgagee against
the grantee is at law and in his own right, or in equity and in
the right of the mortgagor only, is, as was adjudged in Willard
v. Wood, 135 U. S. 309, to be determined by the law of the place
where the suit is brought. By the law of Illinois, where the
- Mr. Justice Gray brought with him to the Supreme Court the inter-
mediate Massachusetts views that he himself had laid down in Exchange
Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37 (1871). The earlier and more satisfactory
views of Chief Justice Shaw must have appealed to him more strongly
when he rendered the opinion in the Hanford case, infrc note 13, and
dissented in the Constable case, inf a note 17.
135 U. S. 309, 10 Sup. Ct. 831 (1890).
l1Willard .Wood, 164 U. S. 502, 17 Sup. Ct. 176 (1896):
33143 U. S. 187, 12 Sup. Ct. 437 (1892).
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present action was brought, as by the law of New York and of
gome other states the mortgagee may sue at law a grantee who,
by the terms of an absolute conveyance from the mortgagor, as-
sumes the payment of the mortgage debt."
This case can be reconciled with Willard v. Wood only by sup-
posing that the law of the District of Columbia differs from
that of Illinois. The "forumn" was a federal court in both cases;
but in the Hanrford case the Court purported to be applying
Illinois law because the federal court in which the suit was
brought sat in that state.
In Joks v. Wscon,' 4 a mortgagee brought an action under
the Arizona code against the mortgagor's grantee who had as-
sumed the debt. After reviewing cases to the effect that the
mortgagee's right was by subrogation only, the Court gave
judgment for the plaintiff, inasmuch as by the Arizona code
"there is no distinction between suits at law and in equity."
:From the foregoing cases it appears that the Court has con-
sistently recognized that a mortgagee beneficiary has an en-
forceable right and that the Supreme Court will give the form
of remedy that is given by the local law applicable to the
particular case.
In Hagen v. Scottisk Union Is. Co.,'1 an owner of a boat
took out a marine insurance policy for the benefit "of whom it
may concern" and later sold an interest in the boat to another.
It was held that the purchaser and the promisee could jointly
maintain a libel in admiralty on the policy. The purchaser
seems to be a, third party beneficiary. He might perhaps be re-
garded as an assignee of part of the promisee's right; but fire
insurance policies are not ordinarily assignable, and the pur-
chaser's right seems rather to rest upon the promisee's inten-
tion to have the contract of insurance so drawn as to create
rights in the subsequent purchaser.'
In several cases the Supreme Court decided against the plain-
tdff on grounds that go to the merits of his claim and that
would be held to invalidate it in nearly all of the state courts.Y
1 80 U. S. 440, 21 Sup. Ct. 445 (1901).
5 Sutpra note 7.
3o "We concur in the view that by virtue of the language contained in the
policy, "on account of -whom it may concern,' it is not necessary that the
person who takes out such a policy should have at that time any specific
individual in mind. If he intended the policy should cover the interest of
any person to -whom he might sell the entire or any part of the interest
insured, that would be enough." Hagan v. Scottish Ins. Co., supra note
11, at 425, 22 Sup. Ct. at 865.
Cf. Merchants & 3L T. Co. v. Robinson etc. Co., supmi. note 7, holding to
the same effect.
'-In Constable v. National S. S. Co., 154 U. S. 51, 14 Sup. Ct. 1062
(1894), the defendant promised a collector of duties to be responsible for
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It was not a question of form of remedy, whether at law or in
equity by subrogation or otherwise. Indeed in one of these
cases three justices dissented and argued that the beneficiary
could maintain the suit that he had brought, a libel in admiralty.
Mr. Justice Gray was one of these dissenters.
Following the example of the states, Congress has enacted
a statute applicable to public contracts requiring the contractor
to give a surety bond to the United States for the benefit of
laborers and materialmen.s This statute has been very liber-
ally construed for the benefit of the third parties to be protected;
and they. have been held to have rights enforceable in an action
"at law," although the statute does not say what the remedy
shall be or in what kind of court the beneficiaries may sue.10
losses by fire; but the consignee had already directly contracted with the
defendant to carry this risk himself. It was held that the consignee could
not hold the defendant on its promise to the collector. The court said:
"No case has gone so far as to hold that, where the person for whose
benefit the contract is made, has himself or by his privy in estate entered
into a contract inconsistent with this, he may repudiate such prior con-
tract, and claim the benefit of the second simply because it has become for
his interest to do so."
Gray, Field, and Jackson, JJ., dissented, finding that there was no con-
flict between the contracts, and holding that the consignee could maintain
a libel in admiralty to enforce the contract made for his benefit with the
collector, by analogy with either law or equity.
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Co., 226 U. S. 220, 33 Sup.
Ct. 32 (1912) held that a citizen has no rights by virtue of a contract
between a water company and a city to supply water for putting out fires,
because that contract is not made for the benefit of particular citizens.
This agrees with the great weight of stata authority.
In Robins- Dry Dock & R. Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303, 48 Sup. Ct. 134
(1927), the decision was in the field of torts; but it was also said that a
contract to refit a ship in dry dock made with the owner and without knowl.
edge that the ship was under charter gave no right to the charterer against
the contractor.
1s 7 U. S. CoMP. STAT. § 6923 (1916).
19Brogan v. Nat'l Sur. Co., 246 U. S. 257, 38 Sup. Ct. 250 (1918);
Illinois Sur. Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U. S. 376, 37 Sup. Ct. 614 (1917) ;
Illinois Sur. Co v. Peeler, 240 U. S. 214, 36 Sup. Ct. 321 (1916); Texas
Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U. S. 157, 34 Sup. Ct. 550 (1914) ; United States
Fid. & G. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 237, 34 Sup. Ct, 88 (1913) ; Title
Guar. & T. Co. v. Crane, 219 U. S. 24, 31' Sup. Ct. 140 (1910); Mankln v.
Ludowici-Celadon Co., 215 U. S. 533, 30 Sup. Ct. 174 (1910); Davidson
Marble Co. v. Gibson, 213 U. S. 10, 29 Sup. Ct. 324 (1909); U. S. Fid.
Co. v. Struthers-Wells Co., 209 U. S. 306, 28 Sup. Ct. 337 (1908); United
States v. Amer. Sur. Co., 200 U. S. 197, 26 Sup. Ct. 168 (1906).
"The objection in the present case is merely technical, as the parties
stipulated to waive trial by jury, and the case was heard and decided
by the district judge upon facts about which there is no dispute. The
question has not been raised heretofore in'this court, but it has been as-
sumed in many cases that the action to be brought under the statute upon
the contractor's bond; whether the action were instituted by the United
I [Vol. 30
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DECISIONS OF THE CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS
The earlier cases in the lower federal courts agreed with
H d ric v. Lindsay. They were somewhat shaken by the rea-
soning in Nationo' Bank v. Grnd Lodge as to creditor bene-
ficiaries, and some of them have made use of the subrogation
theory set forth in Keller v' Aslbford; but almost uniformly in
a Iarge number of cases they have been able to give to a third
party the substantial relief that he would get in the state
courts. 0 They have often said that the remedy is "in equity";
States, or by the creditors in the name of the United States, was an
action at law." Hughes. 3., in Illinois Sur. Co. v. Peeler, supra at 223, 36
Sup. Ct. at 324.
2 0Federal Surety Co. v. City of Staunton, supr,. note 3; Slavens v.
Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 27 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928) (injured party
sued on liability insurance policy); Dunn v. Clinchfield R. B., 19 F. (2d)
810 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927). (at law for a tort); Compagnie Francaise v.
Bonnasse, 19 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927). (in admiralty, following
either law or equity)i; First Nat. Bank v. Caples, 17 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A.
5th, 1927) (at law on a contractor's surety bond); Duvall-Percival Trust
Co. v. Jenkins, 16 -F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (at law in favor of
the mortgagee against a grantee who had assumed the debt, the promisee
not being personally bound); Collins Mfg. Co. v. Wickvire Steel Co., 14
F. (2d) 871 (D. Mass. 1926). (in equity, against a defendant who received
assets and assumed debts); Evans v. Sperry, 12 F. (2d) 438 (E. D. Ill.
1926) (mortgagee sued grantee, and failed to prove a promise by the
latter); Smith & Co. v. Wilson, 9 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) (at law,
against one who assumed debts); Town of Readsboro v. Hoosac T. & W.
R. R., 6 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) (action lay on a promise by
defendant to keep a bridge in repair, the promisee being bound to plain-
tiff to do this); Davis v. Dittmar, 6 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925)
(promise to supply seaworthy barges); In re Walker Grain Co., 3 F. (2d)
872 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925) (trustee for creditors can sue on a bond to the
United States for their benefit); Mobile Shipb. Co. v. Federal Bridge &
S. Co., 280 Fed. 292 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922) (at law, defendant having as-
sented thereto; certiorari denied, 260 U. S. 726, 43 Sup. Ct. 88 (1922));
Phila. Rubber W. Co. v. U. S. Rubber R. Works, 27T Fed. 171 (C. C. A.
2d, 1921) (bill in equity against the purchaser of a business who had
assumed all its obligations).
In re Roth, 272 Fed. 516 (N. D. Ohio 1920) (a grantee vho assumes
mortgage debt is principal debtor); Princess Amusement Co. v. Wells,
271 Fed. 226 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921) (in equity); Commercial Trust Co. v.
Laurens Co., 267 Fed. 897 (S. D. Ga. 1920) (bank taking over obligations
and assets of a debtor bank can be sued in equity); Gooch v. Buford, 262
Fed. 894 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920) (wife sued at law on contraeb made by her
husband for special hospital attendance); In xe H. L. Herbert & Co., 262
Fed. 682 (C. C. A, 2d, 1919) sernble; Weinhard v. Thompson Est, 242
Fed. 315 (D. Ore. 1917); Smith v. Robins, 236 Fed. 114 (C. C. A. 8th,
1916); Gibson v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 232 Fed. 225 (D. N. 3. 1916)
(at law); Silver King Coalition U. Co. v. Silver King Consol. U. Co.,
204 Fed. 166 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913) (in equity, to enforce defendants
promise to discharge plaintiff's unliquidated claim for a trespass); Penn.
Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry, 189 Fed. 66. (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911) somblo
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and they have in a very few instances denied the plaintiff a.
remedy "at law," 21 supposing that the Supreme Court so re-
quired. It can now be said to be well established, however, that
an action "at law" will be sustained in the federal courts if that.
remedy would be available by the local law.22  In addition, the-
(in. equity); Hanlon v. Smith, 175 Fed. 192 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1909);:
Loose v. Hartford etc. Corp., 159 Fed. 318 (C. C. Conn. 1908) (in equity);.
Gray v. Grand Trunk W. Ry., 156 Fed. '736 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907) (buyer
of assets from a receiver who assumes all previous obligations can be sued;
at law by one having a claim for damages for a tort); Bethlehem Iron,
Co. v. Hoadley, 152 Fed. 735 (C. C. R. I. 1907) semblo (at law); Good-
year Shoe Mach. Co. v. Dancel, 119 Fed. 692 (C. C. A. 2d, 1902); same, 144
Fed. 679 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906). (in equity); Quigley v. Spencer Stone Co.,
143 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 7th, 1906). (in equity, said to be no right "at law");
Newport News v. Potter, 122 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903) (applying a
Virginia statute); Central Elec. Co. v. Sprague Elec., Co., 120 Fed. 925.
(C. C. A. 7th, 1902) semble (at law); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Baltimore,
& 0. R. R., 94 Fed. 722 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1899). (in equity); Green v..
Turner, 86 Fed. 837 (C. C. A. 7th, 1898) semble (in equity).; Stephenson,
v. Monmouth M. & M. Co., 84 Fed. 114 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897)) (at law on,
a contractor's surety bond); Winters v. Hub. M. Co., 57 Fed. 287 (C. C..
Idaho 1893) (in equity but not at law); Orman v. N. Ala. Development Co.,
53 Fed. 469 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1892) (law); Pope v. Porter, 33 Fed. 7'
(C. C, S. D. Iowa 1887) (law); In re Lloyd, 22 Fed. 88 (C. C. W. D. Pa.
1884) (creditor beneficiary can prove in bankruptcy); Timayenis v. Union.
M. L. Ins. Co., 21 Fed. 223 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884) (beneficiary of in-.
surance policy sued at law); Sonstiby v. Keeley, 7 Fed. 447, 11 Fed. 578.
(C. C. Minn. 1882) (law).
In Penna. Cement Co. v. Bradley Con. Co., 7 F. (2d) 822 (C. C. A. 2d,.
1925), the defendant promised a city to pay abutting owners all damages
caused to them by certain subway construction. The court, following New
York law, said that the plaintiff had a right as a beneficiary of this.
promise, but held that a condition precedent ha4 not been fulfilled.
2 1 Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v. Dance], supra note 20 (plaintiff won in
equity, after remedy at law was denied); Winters v. Hub. M. Co., supra.
note 20 (remedy in equity only)-; Jesup v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 48 Fed.
483 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1890) (dictum).; Anderson v. Fitzgerald, 21 Fed..
294 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1884) (promise to pay subcontractor's creditors).
In Quigley v. Spencer Stone Co., 143 Fedj 86 (C. C. A. '7th, 1906), X
had promised the plaintii to perform the plaintiff's duty to another to.
supply stone ballast for a railroad. The defendant promised X to perform
this duty. Held, that the plaintiff could sue the defendant "in equity"'
for breach; but the court said there was no remedy "at law."
22 Unibn Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hanford, supra note 13 (Illinois law); Johns V.
Wilson, supra note 14 (Arizona law); In re Roth, 272 F. 516 (N. D. Ohio.
1920).; Gibson v. Victor Talking M. Co., 232 Fed. 225 (D. N. J. 1916)
(applying New Jersey law, and sustaining an action at law in favor of a.
creditor beneficiary; the court gave a very intelligent review of the cases) ;
Fish v. First Nat. Bank, 150 Fed. 524 (C. C. A. 9th, 1907) (Alaska law);
Adams v. Shirk, 105 Fed. 659 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901) semble.
In Mobile Shiph. Co. v. Federal Bridge & S. Co., 280 Fed. 292 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1922), where the plaintiff was a creditor beneficiary, the court-
thought its right was equitable only; but since there had been trial at-
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-federal courts will not refuse a remedy "in equity" even though
the local law gives a remedy "at law" also.2 The third party
need not be a "sole" beneficiary and need not have been identi-
fied when the contract was made.F The contract may create a
-privilege in the third party as well as a right-a defense as
-well as a cause of action.s Occasionally the court avoids the
issue by creating an artificial privity and finding that the plain-
tiff was a promisee.F°
In a comparatively small number of cases, the federal court
has denied the plaintiff a remedy for reasons that would like-
wise prevail in the state courts, but not because third parties
have no rights because not in privity. Thus, the court may
find that the plaintiff is at most a mere incidental beneficiary,
law v-wih the defendant's assent the court affirmed the judgment The
court said:
"The case was fully tried by the court without a jury. The facts
respecting liability are not! in serious dispute. The parties have fully and
fairly litigated the question of damages. If we were to reverse the judg-
ment, it would not be with directions to dismiss but to transfer the cause
from the law to the equity side of the calendar. The district judge who
presided over the law action would sit as chancellor in the equity suit, and
upon the same evidence no doubt make the same findings. Unless re-
quired by the rules and the established precedents, we are unwilling thus
to pay fribute to form."
23 Pittsburgh etc.' R. R. v. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co., 68 Fed. 19 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1895).
24 Central Trust Co. v. Berwind-W. Coal Co., 95 Fed. 391 (C. C. S. D.
X. Y. 1899) held that a mortgagee could sue a coal lessee who had promised
to pay royalties for coal mined to the mortgagee foe interest on the mort-
gage debC The court said, 'It is not required that the benefit of the plain-
tiff should be the sole object of the agreement."
In Barker v. Pullmans P. Car Co., 124 Fed. 555 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1903), a debtor transferred its assets to the defendant and the latter as-
sumed all its debts. The creditor was" held to have an enforceable right
against the defendant. "IThe questioi is not free from doubt, but this
court is of the opinion that it was not necessary to name the creditors of
the Wagner Co., or specify their respective claims, their nature or amount,
or that the benefit of such creditors should have been the sole object of
this clause of the agreement."2 Central Trust Co. v. Cincinnati, J. & M. Ry., 58 Fed. 500 (C. C. N. D.
Ohio 1892) held that if a4 creditor accepts the bonds of a newly organized
company in satisfaction of the debt of an old company, the latter as bene-
ficiary of the contract is therebyl discharged even though it says and does
nothing in the matter. Taft, J., rendering the opinion, cited Hendrick v.
Lindsay, supra note 4, as authority.
-eAmerican Can Co. v. Garnett, 279 Fed. 722 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922). The
defendant promised a patentee to make and supply the article to the
patentee's agents on certain terms. The court held that the agents became
parties to this contract and could sue for its breach. Certiorari was
denied, 260 U. S. 722, 43 Sup. Ct. 12 (1922).
Adams v. Shirk, supra note 22 (plaintiff's assent to the undertaking by
the defendant as assignee of a lease held to make him a promisee and hence
in privity).
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the parties not having intended him to benefit by the contract.2
The suit may be on a contractor's surety bond, and the court
may follow the rule in some minority state refusing the plaintiff
a remedy.28 There may have been an agreement between the
plaintiff and the promisor that contradicts the inference that
the plaintiff was a beneficiary of the new contract.2 Or the
third party's right may have been subject to a condition prec-
edent that has not. been fulfilled.30
271n re Gubelman, 13 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (a banking agency
contract, of which the plaintiff was a mere incidental beneficiary; there
are some statements in the opinion that the federal decisions do not sus-
tain); American Exch. Bank v. Northern Pac. R. R., 76 red. 130 (C. 0.
N. D. Wash. 1896); Jackson Iron Co. v. Negaunee Con. Co., 65 Fed. 298
(C. C. A. 6th, 1895). (defendant's promise was in the alternative giving
him option to pay another than the plaintiff).
In Sayward v. Dexter, Horton & Co., 72 Fed. 758 (C. C. A. 9th, 1896),
a creditor made a contract with another person whereby that other per-
son was to market the debtor's goods and was to make payments to the
creditor, the latter promising not to sue his debtor so long as the pay-
ments were made as agreed. The creditor later sued the debtor, and
the latter set up the contract not to sue. The court held that the contract
was a marketing agreement made for the benefit of the contracting parties
alone and that it gave the debtor no defense. The decision should not
be followed.
28 Federal Sur. Co. v. Minneapolis S. & M. Co., 17 F. (2d) 242 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1927) (applied what the court erroneously believed to be Mon-
tana law and denied the third party a right under a contractor's surety
bond); United States F. & G. Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 16 F. (2d) 83
(C. C. A. 7th, 1926) (same, following Minnesota cases as to contractor's
bonds); Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity & D. Co., 275 Fed. 114 (S. D. N. Y.
1921) (followed a recent New York decision denying a materialman a
remedy "at law," but-suggested a remedy "in equity"; affirmed in 285
Fed. 367 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922)); National Sur. Co. v. Brown-Graves Co., 7
F. (2d). 91 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925) (laborers and materialmen too remote
where the surety bond was given to lenders of capital to protect them
against liens on the building in which the capital was used).
In Minneapolis S. & M. Co. v. Federal Sur. Co., 34 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A.
8th, 1929), a second hearing of the first case cited in this note, the court
adhered to its first decision, even though a Montana decision had mean-
time shown tle error as to Montana law. This time, however, the decision
was put on the ground that by the terms of the bond the plaintiff was not
made a beneficiary.29 Constable v. National S. S. Co., supra note 17.
30 In Penna. Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 198 Fed. 721 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1912), a lessee from a mortgagor assumed and promised to pay
the debt secured; it was held that this was a promise to pay a deficiency
only and that foreclosure was a condition precedent-a doubtful interpre-
tation. But the court said:
"In England and in some of the States the rule is adhered to that the
only persons who can sue upon a contract are the parties; that a third
person for whose benefit a contract is made cannot maintain an action
upon it. The reason for the rule is said to be that there is no privity
between the contracting party making the promise and the third person
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IS THE'THIRD PARTY'S RIGHT LEGAL OR EQUITABLE?
It should be evident from what is written above that there
is no "federal" system apart from the state systems and that
the third party has no "federal" right with a uniform charac-
ter of its own distinct and'apart from his right in the state
courts. But in the federal courts there are still procedural dis-
tinctions between "law" and "equity" and there still lingers a
trace of the notion that a right "in equity" differs fr'om a right
"at law" in some "substantive" way, quite iiidependent of remedy
and procedure. This has caused a good deal of argument over
whether the right of a beneficiary was "in equity" or "at law."
This is a dispute over words and forms of remedy. In actual
results, in what the court in fact does -for the beneficiary and
against the promisor, there is no very substantial difference be-
tween the cases saying that the right is "in equity" and those
giving a remedy "at law." The beneficiary gets the money and
the promisor has to pay it. There is some difference in the form
of pleadings. In the equity suit the parties have no right to
a trial by jury, although the court may make .use of a jury if
it desires. The beneficiary's right is no less "direct" in the one
case than in the other, for the third party is suing the promisor
"directly" in either case and the judgment or decree is for a
"direct" payment. By the "subrogation" theory it might be
supposed that the third party can win only in case he has a
valid claim against the promisee and the latter has a valid claim
against the promisor, that there may be defenses available to
the promisor "in equity" that would not be available to hin if
the third party's remedy is held to be "at law." The actual de-
cisions do not show this to be the case.31 The subrogation
theory, when resorted to bi the plaintiff, always gets him his
decree for payment, except in those cases where his action at
law would likewise be defeated. Defenses that are good "in
equity" are available "at law" also; and it is believed that de-
fenses that would fail "at law" will equally fail "in equity."
and that the consideration does not move directly from the latter. The
rule has the merit of simplicity but is calculated to permit injustice. It
is founded, too, upon wholly artificial distinctions. There is no real and
substantial reason why, if the parties to a contract recognize the interest
of a third person in it and desire and intend to give him a right of action
upon it, they should not be able to do so. And the prevailing doctrine in
this country is contrary to the English rule. It is generally held, subject
to qualifications, thab a third person may sue upon a promise made to
another for his benefit. Ibid. 749.
3" Duvall-Percival Trust Co. v. Tenkins, supra note 3, was a case that
could not rest on a theory of subrogation. The defendant Vas a mortgagor's
grantee -who assumed the debt, but the mortgagor (promisee) was not
himself bound to pay it. The mortgagee was given judgment; the fe deral
court sitting in Kansas applied the law of MissourL
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Of course there are equitable remedies, such as injunction and
specific performance, that were not available at common law
and that must still be petitioned for in the federal courts in
accordance with "equity" pleading; but this does not mean that
the right being enforced was not a "legal" right.
The Supreme Court has rightly determined that the differ-
ence is only one of form of remedy. Thus, in an action "at
law," by a mortgagee against a grantee who had assumed the
debt, Mr. Justice Gray said: "The form of his remedy, whether
it must be in covenant or in assumpsit, at law or in equity, is
governed by the lex fori, the law of the District of Columbia,
where the action was brought"; and the Court gave judgment
for the defendant.82 This has at times been understood to mean
that the federal courts constitute a single "forum," and that in
those courts the only remedy available to a third party bene-
ficiary is "in equity." 33 That Justice Gray did not mean this
is shown by the opinion of the Court, written by himself, in
a later case.3' Instead, the decision meant only that if the law
of the District of Columbia recognized no right enforceable by
a remedy, at law, that law would be applied in a suit brought
in the District of Columbia.
Statutory reformation of procedure, the abolition of common
law forms of action, and the joinder of common law and equity,
are slowly having their effect upon the legal profession and are
breaking down the conception of law and equity as necessarily
separate and independent systems. It is now settled that if, by
the state law that the federal court selects as that by which
the rights of the parties are determined, the third party can
recover a judgment for damages against the promisor without
the use of equity forms and terminology, he can recover in the
federal court in the same manner. That is, as the courts may
put it, if the plaintiff could recover in an action at law in the
state court, he can do the same in the federal court and is not
compelled to bring a bill in equity.
The state law cannot empower a federal court to give a remedy
that the federal law does not empower it to give; but the federal
law fully empowers the federal courts to give all the remedies
that courts of common law and courts of equity have been ac-
customed to give. Therefore, when a state recognizes that a.
third party has a right against a promisor, enforceable by a
judgment for money damages, the federal court has power to
82 Willard v. Wood, supra note 11.
In a later case between the same parties, the mortgagee's bill in equity
was dismissed on the ground of laches. Willard v. Wood, supra note 12.
33See Goodyear Shoe M. Co. v. Dance], 119 Fed. 692 (C. C. A. 2d, 1902).
34 Union Ins. Co. v. Hanford, supra note 13.
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give a like remedy derived from the federal law that created
the court.3
THE BENEFICIARY'S RIGHT IN ADMIRALTY
A federal judge, sitting in his customary chair, or on his
usual bench, changes his juristic coat with chameleon-like
rapidity. Now he is a judge at common law; next he is a
chancellor in equity; agaii he wears the gold lace of the Lord
High Admiral; soon he puts on the dusty shoes of the merchant
judge who administered the law merchant in the court of
Pipowder (pied poudre) ; he administers the law of taxation and
finance, perhaps without observing that he is siding before the
checkered table with the Barons of the Exchequer; through it
all he continually applies rules laid down for him by constitu-
tions and by legislatures, seldom being told whether in sa do-
ing he is a law judge, a chancellor, or an admiral. He must
be puzzled occasionally to know in what capacity he sits on
his single bench and whence comes the law that he applies. In
whichever capacity he sits, he cannot escape from the petitions
of the third party beneficiary. And so we have cases "in ad-
miralty" as' well as "in equity" and "at law"; and we find our
court with Joseph's coat sustaining a libel "in admiralty" 31 in
behalf of the beneficiary as well as a bill "in equity" or assump-
sit "at law." The right that the admiral is enforcing is the
same right that he enforces as a judge or a chancellor; the
remedies that he gives will produce substantially the same re-
sults, but his procedure will have a rolling gait and his language
will carry a salty flavor.
Thus where the state law gives a mechanie's Hen enforceable by both
legal and equitable remedies, the fact that there is a remedy at law does
not prevent the federal court from giving its usual equitable remedy.
Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U. S. 574, 13 Sup. Ct. 936 (1893).
0 Compagnie Francaise v. Bonnasse, 19 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) ;
Munich Ins. Co. v. Dodwell, 128 Fed. 410 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904); see also
Ragan v. Scottish Union Ins. Co., supra, note 7; Constable v. National
S. S. Co, supra note 17.
